Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Theses
5-2022

A Survey of Indicators of Zionism, Antisemitism, and their
Convergence with American Christian Nationalism
Jessica Liberman
jliberm@clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Part of the Politics and Social Change Commons, and the Sociology of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Liberman, Jessica, "A Survey of Indicators of Zionism, Antisemitism, and their Convergence with
American Christian Nationalism" (2022). All Theses. 3776.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/3776

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for
inclusion in All Theses by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact
kokeefe@clemson.edu.

Theses

A SURVEY OF INDICATORS OF ZIONISM, ANTISEMITISM, AND THEIR
CONVERGENCE WITH AMERICAN CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM
A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
Social Science
by
Jessica Liberman
May 2022
Accepted by:
Dr. Matthew Costello, Committee
Chair Dr. Andrew Whitehead
Dr. Miao Li
Dr. Thomas V. Maher

ABSTRACT

Since the 1970s, the American Christian right has favored U.S. involvement with
the state of Israel, supporting it through decades of conflict with its Muslimmajority neighbor, Palestine. Antisemitism in the United States has surged since
the 2016 election of Donald Trump, along with growing research interest among
sociologists in a theopolitical phenomenon called Christian nationalism. Building
upon research documenting the civic, racial, and ethnic exclusivism of Christian
nationalist ideology as well as theory suggesting Christian Zionism, despite
appearing philosemitic, is structured by antisemitism that views Israel and Jews as
artifacts of biblical prophecies, I theorize that such factors are associated with
individuals’ support of Israel as well as belief in antisemitic stereotypes that
racialize and other Jewish diaspora. Drawing upon data from a survey I designed
and distributed to undergraduates at two U.S. universities during the spring
semester of 2022, I find that (1) Christian nationalism was the fourth strongest
predictor of respondents’ support of Israel, decreasing their odds of support, but
was tied for the strongest predictor increasing odds that respondents support neither
Israel or Palestine, and (2) Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of
increased antisemitic beliefs among respondents, even when controlling for support
of Israel. Findings suggest that Christian Zionism may not overlap with Christian
nationalism as previously theorized, yet Christian nationalism maintains religious
and ethnic boundaries via prejudiced, antisemitic beliefs towards Jews.
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INTRODUCTION
Cultural divides have become increasingly apparent and harder to bridge in the years since
Donald Trump’s successful presidential campaign in 2016. Contentions regarding the state of
Israel predate Trump’s term due to Christian Zionist bases, but his actions and administration’s
policies involving the country kept it ever-relevant alongside some of the highest rates of
antisemitic incidents in the U.S. since the 1970s (Anti-Defamation League, 2019). The first year
of President Biden’s term saw historic escalations in the conflict between Israel and Palestine,
resulting in a ceasefire called May 21st of 2021 (Dominy, 2021); However, continued debate
regarding the role of the United States in moderating this conflict indicates that Israel will
continue to be a pivotal issue in American politics. A growing undercurrent to these divides has
been a conservative theopolitical ideology referred to as Christian Nationalism (Whitehead &
Perry, 2020). I have designed and distributed a survey to identify relationships between Christian
Nationalist beliefs, belief in antisemitic stereotypes, and support of Israel among students at two
U.S.-based university campuses, and this thesis will detail my initial findings.
Little empirical research of Christian nationalism explores its relation to antisemitism,
while empirical research of Christian Zionism, perhaps influenced by its subject, often addresses
Jews in the abstract, synonymous with Israel as biblical artifacts in the overarching narrative of
Christian eschatology. In my approach, I aim to survey opinions and perceptions of both Jews
and Israel in effort to illuminate the relationship between Christian nationalism, Christian
Zionism, and antisemitism. To this end, the following research questions need addressed:
1.

How do believers of Christian nationalism perceive and conceptualize Jews?

2.

Do indicators of Christian Zionism overlap with Christian nationalism?
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Christian nationalism
Christian nationalism is neither purely a civil nor religious ideology. Belief in Christian
nationalist sentiment extends beyond civil religion in its explicit references to the Christian God
and Jesus (Whitehead et al., 2018), yet it does not always correlate with an individual’s
religiosity (Perry et al., 2020). Rather, Whitehead and Perry (2020, pp. ix–x) define Christian
nationalism as “an ideology that idealizes and advocates a fusion of American civic life with a
particular type of Christian identity and culture.” Whitehead and Perry (2020) identify followers
of Christian Nationalism as holding such beliefs as “the President of the United States should be
a Christian,” “The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation,” and
among white believers of Christian nationalism, fears that whites may no longer be the majority
in the United States. It is cultural framework fusing aspects religious fundamentalism, political
conservatism, American exceptionalism, and nationalism.
Research has identified three primary elements of the ideology: 1) a moral traditionalism
that upholds hierarchal social arrangements (Bjork-James, 2020; Perry & Whitehead, 2020;
Whitehead & Perry, 2015), 2) authoritarian approaches to social control (Baker et al., 2020a; J.
T. Davis & Perry, 2020; Perry et al., 2019), and 3) perceived ethnic and racial boundaries that
restrict civic membership, national identity, and belonging (Baker et al., 2020b; Dahab & Omori,
2019; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018; Perry & Whitehead, 2015a). My research is concerned with this
third element; how Christian nationalism perceives Jewish identity in America, whether Jewish
Americans are truly Americans in this framework, and how Israel, as a nation-state, is
conceptualized similarly to or different from Jewish people.
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Christian Zionism
The existence of both Jewish and Christian Zionism predates the establishment of the state of
Israel in 1948 but has gained increasing traction within American politics in the years since
(Haija, 2006). Christian Zionism is an ideology informed primarily by literalist interpretations of
the bible regarding the role of Jews and Israel in messianic traditions (Ariel, 2006), sometimes
including the apocalyptic belief that Christ will return before his millennial rule, also known as
“premillennial dispensationalism” (Durbin, 2018; Haija, 2006). The return of the Jewish people
to Israel, and its subsequent fall is believed to be the causal event in this prophesized day of
reckoning. Other expressions of Christian Zionism include a belief that Christians have a sort of
deep-seated connection to state of Israel for being the biblical birthplace of Christianity, thus
have a say in its government’s politics and a claim to shared identity, or heritage with Israel or
Jews. These claims often propose a shared “Judeo-Christian” tradition.
Although Cohen (1969) contested early uses of “Judeo-Christian” to imply religious
consensus among the traditions, he had visions of social and political coexistence. Perhaps to that
end, “Judeo-Christian values” became a sort of rallying point for many in conservative and
Evangelical circles in the United States during the late 70s (Hartmann et al., 2005), and it
continues to be used hand-in-hand with Christian Zionist rhetoric. In the United States today,
many Christian-led organizations lobby in the interest of Israel alongside Jewish organizations,
although a recent report by the Pew Research Center indicated that American Jews are less likely
to express support for the state of Israel than Christians (Smith, 2019).
In empirical research exploring Evangelical support of Israel, partisanship and
conservative ideology were identified as significant predictors of support (Mayer, 2004), while a
survey of 2,002 Evangelical U.S. adults by LifeWay Research found that black and younger
3

(ages 18-34) Evangelicals more frequently report having “no strong views” on Israel (Rosenberg,
2017). LifeWay’s survey also found that two of the most frequently reported primary reason that
respondents had for supporting Israel were faith-based, such as belief that “The Bible says God
gave the land of Israel to the Jewish people,” and “The Bible says Christians should support
Israel”. More recently, Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd (2021) hypothesized that Evangelical survey
respondents would be motivated by Christian eschatology (e.g. premillennial expectations about
Christ’s return and belief that Jews are God’s “chosen people”), geopolitical and security
concerns (Israel as a guarantor of Western security and Christian access to holy sites in the
Middle East), the frequency at which they hear support of Israel from other Christians, as well as
their personal religiosity. All but the common geopolitical and security concerns were found to
be significant predictors of Evangelical support, and contrary to prior research, there are
significant relationships between support of Israel and respondents’ age even when controlling
for religiosity. While Lifeway Research, and particularly Inbari et al. (2021), provide a variety of
hypothetical motivations for Evangelical support of Israel, I am aware of no research to date that
has explored the relationship between any number of these motivations with Christian
nationalism.
Antisemitism
American Jews were largely perceived as assimilated to white gentile culture for the past half
century (Ratskoff, 2020), despite the persistence of antisemitism, often coupled with conspiracy,
in what was considered fringe circles. However, according to Porter-Szűcs (2021), racialized and
nationalist antisemitism proliferates when Jewish diaspora are no longer “easily identifiable” or
distinguishable from white gentiles in terms of their socioeconomic status. It follows that, amid
increasing “fringe” white nationalist activity in public spheres (e.g., 2016 chants of “Jews will
4

not replace us” at the Charlottesville Unite the Right Rally), discourse surrounding Jewish
whiteness has been renewed among the general populace (Franco, 2020). Research prior to the
2020 election found that ardent embracers of Christian nationalism believe on average four
antisemitic stereotypes often incorporated into conspiracies, a number that doubled when
accounting for support of additional QAnon conspiracies (Djupe & Dennen, 2021).
Such conspiracies must also be understood for their role in racially and ethnically
othering Jews (Porter-Szűcs, 2021). For example, the 1970s also saw the rise of a “porn
conspiracy,” which posited that Jews were undermining white Christian racial purity by
producing pornography depicting interracial relations (Kerl, 2020). In the time since, Jews, either
individual Jews such as George Soros (Lavin, 2018), or Israel as a chimerical “collective Jew”
(Klug, 2003), have found themselves at the heart of conspiracies such as globalism (Barkun,
2013; Rensmann, 2011) blood libel, and dual loyalty.
Inversely, antisemitism may be perpetuated under the guise of “philosemitism” from
Christian Zionists, which are ultimately fetishizations that conflate Israel and Jewish identity
(O’Donnell, 2021; see also Sturm, 2017). This conflation can also inadvertently promote
stereotypes of Jewish dual loyalty, a conspiracy that Jews are ultimately loyal to Israel, wherever
they are in the world (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.-a; Kampeas, 2020).
Empirical research has shown how Christian nationalism engages in conspiracy and
stereotypes regarding Jews (Djupe & Dennen, 2021), and provided evidence that there is a
difference in how adherents perceive Israel and Jews- supporting the country while perceiving
Jewish people as a threat (Whitehead & Perry, 2020, p. 112). However, researchers have yet to
explore the motivations for these differences among followers of Christian nationalism and how
they may inform the basis of their stereotypical beliefs in unprecedented ways.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Anderson (1983/2016) is credited with providing the framework for how nationalism is often
conceptualized today. He argues that nationalism is not based in or necessarily preceded by
collectivity, rather that it is ideologically constructed during the process of modernization.
Anderson further states that nationalism replaces other ideologies of identity during this
modernization process (e.g., religious, imperial, or local identities). Rather than coming from
these social, ethnic, or historic communities “organically”, nationalism, as an ideological and
cultural force, creates those identities (Porter-Szűcs, 2021). In this sense, a nation itself comes to
mean an “imagined political community,” distinct from other “imagined” communities by the
ways in which it is imagined; limited and sovereign (Anderson, 1983/2016, p. 6). Porter-Szűcs
supplements Anderson by noting this conception of nationalism identifies its core as a “tool of
political mobilization, as a means to draw lines of inclusion and exclusion around communities,
and as the core concept in a ‘discourse’ of power” (2021, p. 165).
Anderson (1983/2016) states that nation is limited, which is to say it has boundaries, and
by design, will always mean to exclude some group or another. Nations are sovereign, because
there arose times where ontological claims and territory had to be derived from somewhere other
than dynasties and religion, and the “freedom” of the nation fills this need (however; he is not
attempting to provide a historical explanation for various nationalisms a priori). Lastly, nations
are a community because it is always conceptualized “horizontally,” despite whatever hierarchies
of inequality and exploitation exist within it.
If, as Anderson (1983/2016) asserts, nationalism overtakes religious identity as “tools” of
political power, how can Christian nationalism come to be? Moreover, how can Christian
Zionism be a nationalist endeavor? How do both relate to various frameworks of antisemitism,
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and are the ways in which they do truly nationalist? While I first argue that Anderson’s
conception of nationalism is not as incompatible with Christian nationalism as it appears on its
face, it must be augmented and updated to proceed with Christian Zionism, before explaining the
role of antisemitism. To this end, there are a few additional theoretical explanations that thread
back between the two concepts.
Theoretically substantiating the “nationalism” of Christian Nationalism
Anderson (1983/2016) is very concerned with the cognitive process of nationalism, how the
imagined nation becomes a legacy and destiny that one is willing to die for- a cultural system of
mythic connectivity, fortuity, fatality, and continuity. Whitehead and Perry (2020) are similarly
interested in not whether the United States is a Christian nation or not (as Anderson might say,
having a universal religion), rather how Christian nationalism becomes a cultural framework that
informs how those who embrace it view the world and mobilize to preserve its perceived order.
The definition of “Christian” for Christian nationalism is better understood as an “active process
of socially-shared identity formation” rather than individual religious practice or belief system
(Miller, 2021), which serves to differentiate the religious components of Christian nationalism
from how Anderson defines religion.
Anderson’s fatalistic conceptions of national identity are not dissimilar from how
Whitehead and Perry identify adherents of Christian nationalism as believing “God requires the
faithful to wage wars for good,” (2020, p. 14), or how Gorski (2017, 2018) characterizes
Christian nationalism as justifying “bloody” conquest and purity. Arguably, the Christian
ontology identified by Whitehead, Perry, and Gorski fits Anderson’s (1983/2016) definition of
nationalism for its “imagined” Christian community and history for the American nation, despite
the United States’ religious pluralities and violent, historical inequalities.
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Whitehead et al. further cite Gorski (2016/2020) to state current manifestations of
Christian nationalism emphasize “only [Christianity’s] notions of exclusion [emphasis added]
and apocalyptic war and conquest” (2018, p. 150), which echoes the utilities of nationalism per
Porter-Szűcs (2021) and Anderson (1983/2016). This ontology comes with a distinct insecurity
over the nation’s Christian past and future (Whitehead et al., 2018) (c.f. “legacy” and “destiny”
apropos Anderson). This fear is described by both Whitehead and Perry (2020) and Gorski
(2018) as premillennial, compelling Christians to delay America’s moral decline until the
biblical Rapture.
Premillennialism and Christian Zionism as Christian nationalism
Premillennialism, or End-times Christianity (Duff, 2021), is a connecting thread between
Christian nationalism and Christian Zionism. While premillennialism is at its core based on
interpretations of Christian biblical texts as prophecies, Duff notes that these interpretations often
serve a “crass utilitarianism” wherein efforts towards righteous or holy ends can justify nearly
any means. For many End-times Christians, these means often center Israel and U.S. intervention
in its conflict with Israel’s neighboring Muslim-majority countries.
Käsemann claims the fundamental question of apocalypticism “To whom does the
sovereignty of the world belong?” (1969, as cited in Duff, 2021, p. 475), which Duff contrasts
with the first commandment ‘Have no other gods before me’. She claims Christian nationalism
breaks this commandment by worshipping the nation before God while framing Christian
salvation as reserved for the United States alone. However, while the answer of Christian
nationalism to this question of sovereignty posed by Käsemann may be contradictory to the
Christian faith, it falls right in line with Anderson’s (1983/2016) sovereignty of the nation per
nationalists.
8

Just as Gorski and Perry (2020, para. 16) note Christian nationalism “reveres” power,
boundaries, and order when it comes to race, Sturm (2017, 2018) has argued that the fervor of
American Christian Zionists is a religious nationalism, with not only a national sense of
territoriality, but religious territoriality that ports racial categories onto religious ones through
increasing insistence upon ideas such as “Judeo-Christian values”. Political mobilization to
preserve “Judeo-Christian values” in Israel was quickly understood as synonymous with
preservation of “Western culture”. Such conflation was captured perfectly by Lind (1991, p. 48),
who wrote “Western culture is unusual in having no ethnic requirement for membership-anyone
who accepts traditional Judeo-Christian values can be Western.”
Despite such egalitarian promises by Lind, “Western culture” has been interpreted as a
white, ethno-nationalist construct (Hartmann et al., 2005; Haynes, 2017), if not for the inherent
exclusion of the second largest Abrahamic faith, Islam from its implicit “Judeo-Christian
values”. Sturm (2018) attributes its popularity to increasing Islamophobia and an effort on its
users’ part to distance themselves from associations with antisemitism, thus becoming an empty
signifier of wider conclusion. Indeed, to the first point of Islamophobia, Lind speculated that
Islamic immigration to France may have already “reversed Charles Martel's victory in 732 at the
battle of Tours” (p. 45), while also warning of a “moral decline” in U.S. excellence and
community that might only be saved through “defense of Western culture abroad as at home”
(1991, p. 47). For Christian Zionists, like Christian nationalists mentioned previously, the
erosion of American culture and civic nationalism is a fearful sign of the end times (Sturm,
2018).
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The role of racialized and nationalist antisemitism in apocalyptic philosemitism
O’Donnell (2021) recounts historical antisemitism in Christian Zionism, stating that
antisemitism, as a discursive tradition, is a structuring influence on Christian Zionism evident in
its constructions of Jewish identity, history, and tradition. Duff (2021) outlines these antisemitic
constructions, such as Christian supersessionism, the premillennial belief that “the Old Age” that
God replaces after apocalypse may include Judaism, specifically Jews who do not convert to
Christianity. Additionally, since the prophesized Rapture requires Jews to return to Israel and the
victory of Israel over its enemies, end-times Christians become fervent supporters of Zionist
politics and politicians who stoke conflict in the region. Sturm (2017) suggests the antisemitism
of these constructions has been recognized by contemporary Christian Zionists, and that a
movement towards a more discursive, philosemitic set of relations with Jews away from this
functional one has gained traction. He describes Christian Zionist recognition of Judaism and
Israelis as an “unattainable higher tier” in their religious hierarchy as such an example (Sturm,
2017, p. 10); However, these philosemitic claims will be revisited shortly.
In another work, Sturm describes a Christian tradition of exclusion, where Jews are the
‘outsiders within’ and Muslims the ‘outsiders outside’ (Buchanan & Moore, 2003, as cited in
Sturm, 2018), which bleeds into the apocalyptic battle of “us” versus “them”. This fear of
outsiders once more serves a utilitarian purpose of maintaining moral order and racialized,
religious boundaries. Anderson differentiates racism, “dreams of eternal contaminations”, from
nationalism, which is concerned with “historical destinies” (1983/2016, p. 149). Sturm (2018, p.
313) links back to this idea by characterizing Christian Zionism and its conception of “JudeoChristian values” as an ethno-religious nationalism that operates from a framework of
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anticipation for its “future history,” or destiny, of prophesized Rapture (see also Schüssler
Fiorenza, 1985, p. 40).
However, Anderson (1983/2016) appears to claim racism and antisemitism manifest
within national boundaries, not across, and thus, are not a priori expressions of nationalism.
Here Porter-Szűcs (2021) offers a necessary augmentation of Anderson; In the case of Jews,
conspiracies of international Jewish control at the start of the twentieth century allowed for the
framing of diaspora as ‘a nation within a nation’ (the ‘outsiders within’). Jews become targets of
racialized nationalism when they are most assimilated, no longer distinguishable from white
gentiles in terms of their socioeconomic status, allowing clams of their covert “infestation” to
gain traction. By framing Jewishness as incompatible with any other national identity, according
to Porter-Szűcs, racialized antisemitism is reconciled with nationalist frameworks such as
Anderson’s. I argue that following this logic, the racialization of Jews as ‘outsiders within’
complements the racialization of Muslims in their nationalist framing as the ‘outsiders outside’
in modern Christian Zionism and Christian nationalism.
However, these understandings of antisemitism, racialized, nationalist, and Christian,
seem to come from different philosophies. Together, they are not straightforwardly compatible in
explaining how Christian Zionism’s and Christian nationalism’s premillennialism is also a
nationalist antisemitism, nor how it reconciles supporting Israel (the ultimate ‘collective Jew’
[see Klug, 2003] and ‘outsider’ nation) with traditional antisemitic nationalism. O’Donnell
(2021) points out that traditional antisemitic conspiracies of global control which portray Israel
as a ‘collective Jew’ are seemingly contradictory to Christian Zionist narratives that situate Israel
in opposition to ‘globalist’ threats to America. In the same confusing vein, Whitehead and Perry
(2020, p. 112) found that followers of Christian Nationalism are likely to perceive Jewish people
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as a threat (albeit less likely than Muslims, as well as other ethno-racial & political groups) yet
also view American political support of Israel as instrumental to the success of the United States.
Further, Barreto & Kim (2021) describe protestors waving of Israeli flags and use of other
Jewish iconography at the January 6th Capitol riot in 2021 as an objectification of national
identity by Christian nationalists and a message of Christian triumph.
In an effort to reconcile how these ideologies might coexist, O’Donnell (2021) builds off
Klug’s (2003) theoretical framework for antisemitism, “the Jew” as not a Jewish person, but an
imagined chimerical figure with collective interests akin to that of the ‘nation within’ described
by Porter-Szűcs (2021), to explore the Christian Zionist relationship to Judaism and Jews.
O’Donnell describes a Christian Zionist figure of “‘the Jew’ [sic] —a demonological figure that
both is and is not ‘the Jew’ of classical antisemitism,” (O’Donnell, 2021, p. 41). “The Jew” is a
figure whose individual Jewishness is erased at the same time as its chimerical “Jewishness” is,
and in Christian Zionism, its antisemitic properties are characterized by this invisible operation.
This framework of “the Jew” underwrites American Christian Zionist theo/geopolitics,
mobilizing them to disavow classical antisemitism while supporting a specific form of “Israel”.
This figuration of Israel is one that secures a political and cosmic legitimacy for Christian
Americans, contingent upon the expulsion of Muslims from an Israeli ethno-state.
These theo/geopolitical discourses echo Christian nationalism both in terms of desired
political action and underlying motivations. Gorski and Perry (2020, para. 22) allude to these
potential motivations for Christian nationalist support for Israel, in which an “idealized” form of
Israel is invoked, albeit less religiously derived. In their dialogue, Gorski proposes that Christian
Zionists have nurtured fantasies of Israel’s own nationalist leanings as a militarily strong country
with highly defended borders and (until recent elections) an uncompromisingly ruthless leader in
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Netanyahu, which has an aspirational allure for what America could be under Christian
Nationalism. O’Donnell (2021) and Durbin (2018) explore this authoritarian fantasy as another
element of Israeli government support for Christian Zionists as well. Duff (2021) frames this,
along with a combination of classical antisemitism and premillennial Zionism (similar to the
‘Jewish’ juxtaposition O’Donnell, 2021 proposes) as allowing end-times Christians, understood
by Duff as adherents of Christian Nationalism, to both support Israel (the nation), and fall into
nationalist antisemitic conspiracies, such as Jewish controlled space lasers or secret, cabbalistic
world governments (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.-b).
When considering Durbin (2018), O’Donnell’s (2021) framework of “the Jew” also
allows for the new philosemitic alignment of Christian Zionists described by Sturm (2017)
earlier. According to Durbin, such Christian Zionists are not concerned with the interests of
Jewish people so much as understanding both Jews and Israel as “empty signifiers,” (2018, p.
12). O’Donnell likens these understandings to fetish objects (2021, p. 44) which echoes the role
of fetishization in racialization and ethnic othering of other groups (Cheng, 2006). Durbin
contends these constructions are reflective of neither Judaism or Israelis but “Christianized form
of Judaism that is used in the service of ‘proving’ the ultimate truth of Christianity” (2018, p.
219). Thus, at its best, the antisemitism of Christian Zionism is a “philosemitic” fetishization
which may inadvertently serve to racialize and other American Jews by taking for granted their
otherness and equivocating individual Jews with the state of Israel.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Christian Nationalism has a growing body of research, and similarly, the nature of Christian
support for Israel and its implications for U.S. policy continues to be explored. However, I
believe the nuances motivating an ontological framework that combines Christian nationalism,

13

Christian Zionism, and antisemitic beliefs has been underexplored. Despite a sizeable Christian
Zionist base in the U.S. with philosemitic positions, antisemitic conspiracy theories are more
readily engaged with in in Christian nationalist discourses (Djupe & Dennen, 2021; O’Donnell,
2020). This is of pragmatic interest as antisemitism has been identified as a precursor to
extremist violence (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2020).
Further, I am interested in the implications of these ideologies for the stability of
American Jewish identity in the public sphere. Considered together, O’Donnell (2021), PorterSzűcs (2021), Klug (2003), Duff (2021) and Durbin (2018), seem to suggest there are multiple
ontological framings of Jews engaged with by gentiles, wherein Jewish people can be “the
Jews,” the collective Semite or nation which is the target of antisemitic hostility, or they can
become the fetishized vehicle of Christian Zionism, objects of antisemitic philosemitism.
However, these conceptualizations appear able to coexist within both the Zionist and the hostile
anti-Semite, creating two fictionalized “Jews” divorced from the living people. The nature of
such seemingly contradictory frameworks warrants more empirical research than currently
exists, as it seems reflect changes in the modern-day conceptualization of Jewish diaspora as the
‘outsiders within’ and ‘nation within a nation’.
OBJECTIVES
My research aims to combine measures of Zionism, secular support for Israel, and Christian
nationalism so their relationships with antisemitic beliefs may be explored. A long-term goal of
this thesis research is to develop a more comprehensive battery of survey questions that measure
Christian nationalism, Zionism, and antisemitism for broader distribution to a nationally
representative population. This should be of interest to scholars of religion, sociologists, and
survey practitioners.
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Additionally, insights gained from this research will contribute to the understanding of
Christian nationalism as racializing social force. The identification of new or previously
understudied expressions of antisemitism will aid in the combatting of prejudice.
HYPOTHESES
1.

Respondents who score higher on the Christian nationalism index will be more likely to
support Israel than those who score lower on the index.

Whitehead and Perry (2020) identify how white Christian nationalism strives for clear racial and
ethnic boundaries to secure a hierarchical order in society, with a specific figuration placing
white Christians at the top. Nationalism also serves as a tool for political legitimacy and
mobilization (Anderson, 1983/2016). In line with both, Sturm (2018) theorizes that fear of
Muslims as ethno-racial outsiders and threat to Christian America’s security of eschatological
salvation serves as motivating factors for nationalistic Christian Zionist support of U.S.
intervention in Israeli conflict with Muslim-majority countries.
Gorski and Perry (2020) propose that those aligned with Christian nationalism may in
some part support Israel due to the nation-oriented belief that Israel models the authoritarian
solution for the present moral decline threatening the United States, similarly to some Christian
Zionists (Durbin, 2018; O’Donnell, 2021). This belief allows for support of Israel that is not
explicitly religious or premillennial in nature, though still motivated by support of a social
hierarchy prioritizing Christianity and Christians. Thus, I expect that survey respondents’ support
for Israel will differ based on their scores on the Christian nationalism scale.
2.

Respondents who score higher on the Christian nationalism index will be more likely to
believe more antisemitic stereotypes about Jewish people than those with lower scores,
regardless of their support for Israel.
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O’Donnell (2021) and Durbin (2018) theorize Christian Zionist constructions of Jews and Israel
conflate the two for Christian ontological purposes, and in O’Donnell’s framework of “the Jew”
Christian Zionists are compelled to let their implicit antisemitic assumptions go unexamined. I
believe this framework serves to mysticize, fetishize, and other Jewish people similar to how
other ethnic and racial groups have been in America (Cheng, 2006). Just as racialized nationalist
antisemitism explicitly promotes myths and conspiracy of Jewish dual loyalty to Israel (PorterSzűcs, 2021), I contend these fetishistic beliefs implicitly promote these same myths. This is
complemented by Whitehead and Perry’s (2020) claim that adherents of Christian nationalism
often hold beliefs that “true” Americans must also be Christian Americans.
Thus, I hypothesize that survey respondents who score highly on the Christian
Nationalism scale will be more likely to report believing in stereotypes of dual loyalty than those
who score lower, even when they express support for Israel.
METHODS
Survey Data
A pilot survey approved by Clemson University’s Institutional Review Board was designed and
distributed to collect data enrolled undergraduate students aged 18 years or older from two public
universities in the United States. The survey included a broad range of questions pertaining to
respondents’ perceptions and opinions on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, belief in Jewish stereotypes
and discrimination, as well as their political and religious values. The complete survey
instrument can be found in Appendix A (p. 51). Prior to release of the survey, committee
members provided feedback on question formatting and construction. Several Social Science
graduate students assisted in informal testing of the survey instrument for proper skip logic and
display formatting. Email invitations with links to the web survey were sent to sampled
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undergraduate students on February 15th, 2022, and they were allowed to respond until March
15th, 2022. Data analyzed in this thesis were collected between February 15th and March 1st,
2022, at which point 501 responses were completed, equaling a 6.3% response rate. Future
publications based on this research will use all responses collected from February 15th through
March 15th. Descriptive statistics for valid, nonmissing responses used in analyses and collected
by March 1st are detailed in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Additive CN index (0-19)
Additive antisemitic stereotype
index (0-32)
Israeli-Palestinian Support
Support Palestinians
Support Neither
Support Israel
Respondent race
White
Black or African American
Multi-racial/other
Hispanic, any race
Gender
Woman, non-binary, or other
Man
Age in years
Income
zero – $14,999
$15,000–$29,999
$45,000–$59,000
$100,000 or more
Region of U.S.
Midwest Region
Northeast Region
South Region
West Region
not from US
Type of residence
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Religious Identity
liberal Protestants
Moderate & Other Protestants
Sectarians & Baptists
Catholics
other religions
none/nonreligious
Feelings about the Bible

Site 1 (n = 348)

Site 2 (n = 123)

Total (N = 471)

(4.87)

11.24 (5.50)

10.40 (5.06)

110
136
102

(32%)
(39%)
(29%)

40 (33%)
53 (43%)
30 (24%)

150 (32%)
189 (40%)
132 (28%)

295
16
21
16

(85%)
(5%)
(6%)
(5%)

88
9
10
16

383
25
31
32

199
149
20.45

(57%)
(43%)
(2.07)

298
37
4
9

(86%)
(11%)
(1%)
(3%)

109
14
-

(89%)
(11%)
-

407
51
4
9

(86%)
(11%)
(1%)
(2%)

17
44
269
8
10

(5%)
(13%)
(77%)
(2%)
(3%)

110
1
10
2

(89%)
(1%)
(8%)
(2%)

127
45
279
8
12

(27%)
(10%)
(59%)
(2%)
(3%)

13
284
51

(4%)
(82%)
(15%)

16 (13%)
47 (38%)
60 (49%)

29 (6%)
331 (70%)
111 (24%)

27
83
39
69
12
118

(8%)
(24%)
(11%)
(20%)
(3%)
(34%)

2
29
8
28
12
44

29
112
47
97
24
162

7.03

(4.78)

10.10

17

7.55 (4.67)

(72%)
(7%)
(8%)
(13%)

76 (62%)
47 (38%)
20.52 (3.81)

(2%)
(24%)
(7%)
(23%)
(10%)
(36%)

7.16 (4.75)

(81%)
(5%)
(7%)
(7%)

275 (58%)
196 (42%)
20.46 (2.63)

(6%)
(24%)
(10%)
(21%)
(5%)
(34%)

Word of God
Inspired word
Book of fables
Respondent not askeda
Church attendance
Never
Seldom
A few times a year
Once or twice a month
Once a week
More than once a week
Prayer frequency
Never
Seldom
A few times a month
Once a week
A few times a week
Once a day
Several times a day
Party affiliation
Republican
Democrat
Independent or other
Political views
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal

36
180
50
82

(10%)
(52%)
(14%)
(24%)

13
63
20
27

(11%)
(51%)
(16%)
(22%)

49
243
70
109

(10%)
(52%)
(15%)
(23%)

72
70
77
57
49
23

(21%)
(20%)
(22%)
(16%)
(14%)
(7%)

28
27
26
15
21
6

(23%)
(22%)
(21%)
(12%)
(17%)
(5%)

100
97
103
72
70
29

(21%)
(21%)
(22%)
(15%)
(15%)
(6%)

88
77
43
13
45
47
35

(25%)
(22%)
(12%)
(4%)
(13%)
(14%)
(10%)

27
38
16
6
13
14
9

(22%)
(31%)
(13%)
(5%)
(11%)
(11%)
(7%)

115
115
59
19
58
61
44

(24%)
(24%)
(13%)
(4%)
(12%)
(13%)
(9%)

115
97
136

(33%)
(28%)
(39%)

25 (20%)
36 (29%)
62 (50%)

140 (30%)
133 (28%)
198 (42%)

111
114
123

(32%)
(33%)
(35%)

34 (28%
28 (23%)
61 (50%)

145 (31%)
142 (30%)
184 (39%)

Note. Continuous variables include mean and standard deviation in parentheses. Binary/categorical variables include count and column
percentage in parentheses.
a

Respondents who did not identify as Christian of any denomination or generally were not asked their feelings about the Bible. To

include the variable as a control for Christian fundamentalism, they are not counted missing. This is not an interpretable category.

Sampling design
The survey population consists of U.S. undergraduate students aged 18 years and older. A
combination of convenience and simple random sampling were used to construct a sampling
frame from two U.S. university campuses: one southeastern land-grant university and one
midwestern state university. The enrolled undergraduate populations of the schools in Fall 2021
were 21,577 and 8,147 respectively. Convenience sampling was used to select the university
sites, and simple random sampling was used to select 4000 undergraduate students from each
site.
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This survey population and sampling methods were chosen for three primary reasons:
First, prior research and public policy has highlighted the public university setting and younger
generations in discourses surrounding Israeli-Palestinian conflict and support (Inbari et al., 2021;
Anti-Semitism Awareness Act of 2019, 2019), though policy has often approached from the
angle that this environment and population trend towards support of Palestine and an end of
Israeli occupation. Second, two sites may help in addressing overrepresentation of demographic
characteristics such as region, student geographic origin, race, et cetera that would be present in
a sample of students from a single university. Both sites have higher proportions of in-state
students and students from neighboring or regional U.S. states and territories represented among
undergraduates. Though both sites are predominantly white institutions, the midwestern
university, while being smaller, has an undergraduate population with a racial distribution more
similar to the U.S. Census. Third, limited resources, the context of myself as a student researcher
and this survey being conducted as part of a master’s thesis make university students the most
accessible study population that allows for some application of probabilistic sampling.
Survey type
Considering the time constraints of this program and thesis and my resources, a cross-sectional
survey type has been selected for this research. This approach allows for insight into college-age
populations views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the ceasefire that came into effect on May
21st, 2021. It should be noted that a longitudinal study tracking this thesis’s survey variables
would provide insights into these attitudes and their effects over time as well track the
development of theopolitical opinions in young adults, and future research should consider this
when designing surveys measuring Christian nationalism.
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Data collection mode
The web survey was distributed to 8000 total students on February 15th, 2022 via email. Emails
directed respondents to Qualtrics to complete the survey. Care was taken to format this survey
both visually and functionally for web and mobile completion, per social exchange theoryinformed guidelines (Dillman et al., 2014). Server-wide issues with the Qualtrics platform email
distribution service occurred on February 28th, the date first reminder emails were to be sent to
unfinished respondents, resulting in over 3,000 emails failing to send. The issue was not resolved
until March 3rd, 2022. I suspect this contributes to the lower than anticipated response rate at this
stage of collection. Copies of contact emails are included in Appendix B (p. 92).
A sweepstakes incentive was utilized as pragmatic and cost-effective way to increase
response rates and compensate respondents for their time. This incentive type has been shown to
be particularly effective among university study populations (Laguilles et al., 2011). Amazon gift
cards equivalent in value to $15 and $50 were rewarded to twenty randomly drawn respondents,
with funding provided by Clemson’s Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal
Justice. Respondents were able to voluntarily enter the drawing by providing their name and
email in a separate survey upon completion of the primary survey.
Measurement
Christian Nationalism
To measure Christian Nationalism, an additive index was adapted from five of six questions
from the Baylor Religion Survey (BRS), also utilized by Whitehead and Perry (2020). The index
measures respondents’ agreement with five statements: The federal government should allow
prayer in public schools; The federal government should declare the United States a Christian
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nation; The success of the United States is part of God’s plan; The federal government should
allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces; and The federal government should
enforce strict separation of church and state. The first item was revised to explicitly refer
Christian prayer in public schools, based on criticism that the original wording may be
ambiguously interpreted as support for general religious freedoms by respondents (N. Davis,
2021). Adapting wording from a similar question used in the General Social Survey, respondents
were instead asked “The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local
government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. Do
you agree or disagree with the court ruling?”. Agreement for all 5 items is measured on 5-point
Likert scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5), with the neutral option
coded as a midpoint (3). The items concerning separation of church and state and prayer in
public schools were reverse coded so that 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree. Table 2
describes the mean and standard deviations for each item.
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for CN index variables
Variables
Scale
Mean
The federal government should allow the
display of religious symbols in public spaces.
The success of the United States is part of God’s
plan.
The federal government should advocate
Christian values.
The federal government should enforce strict
separation of church and state.a
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
no state or local government may require the
reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in
public schools. Do you agree or disagree with
the court ruling?a

1(strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree)
1(strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree)
1(strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree)
1(strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree)
1(strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree)

SD

N

3.57

1.23

501

2.46

1.34

501

2.27

1.32

501

4.07

1.14

501

4.01

1.27

501

Note.
a

Item reverse coded in additive index

Alpha tests of the five items yielded a Cronbach’s alpha = .81, indicating high reliability
of the index. Principal component factor analysis suggests the five items load onto a single factor
after varimax rotation. The additive index was set to zero, and observed scores range from 0 to
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19 (mean = 7.22, SD = 4.75). Cronbach alpha coefficients of the six original index items were
also acceptable for both the 2007 and 2017 waves of the BRS (.87 and .85, respectively), and
items similarly loaded onto a single factor using exploratory factor analysis (Whitehead & Perry,
2020, p. 170). This scale has demonstrated predictive validity with data from several surveys,
predicting voting for Donald Trump in elections (Baker et al., 2020b; Whitehead et al., 2018),
COVID-19 attitudes and behaviors (Perry et al., 2020), opposition to interracial marriage and
adoption (Perry & Whitehead, 2015a, 2015b), as well as support for police and punitive justice
(Perry et al., 2019). It’s predictive ability in determining fear of ethnoracial outsiders such as
Muslims (Baker et al., 2020b; Dahab & Omori, 2019; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018) is of particular
interest for my current research.
Dependent Variable 1. Israeli-Palestinian Support
Questions developed by the Anti-Defamation League, Pew Research Center, as well as Inbari,
Bumin, and Byrd (2021) were used to gauge broad support of Israel, its government and citizens.
First, one of two pairs of questions gauging support for either Israeli and Palestinian
governments or Israeli and Palestinian people on bimodal scales ranging from 1 “Very
unfavorable to 5 “Very favorable” were evenly presented to respondents at random, as Pew
Research Center had done for a panel survey of U.S. adults (Pew Research Center, 2019). Then,
a 7-point question used by Inbari et al. (2021) measured support overall support for either Israel
or Palestine which forced respondents to choose on a range from 1 “Very strong support for
Palestinians” 4 “Support Neither” and 7 “Very strong support for Israel”. Means and standard
deviations for these questions are available in Table 3 (p. 23).
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations for Israel-Palestine support variables
Variables
Scale Mean
Considering the situation between Israel
and Palestine overall, where do you place
your support?
Do you have a favorable or unfavorable
opinion of [The Palestinian people]?a
Do you have a favorable or unfavorable
opinion of [The Israeli people]?a
Do you have a favorable or unfavorable
opinion of [The Palestinian government]?b
Do you have a favorable or unfavorable
opinion of [The Israeli government]?b
Note.

1 (Very Strong support for
Palestinians) to 7 (Very Strong
support for Israel)
1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very
Favorable)
1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very
Favorable)
1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very
Favorable)
1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very
Favorable)

a

These 2 questions were set to be evenly presented randomly to 50% of respondents

b

These 2 questions were set to be evenly presented randomly to 50% of respondents

SD

N

3.93

1.43

499

3.19

.81

255

3.09

.82

255

2.74

.83

243

2.82

.98

244

While Inbari et al. (2021) tested their 7-point support measure in ordinal logistic
regression, I suspect that overall support for Israel and Palestine may not follow an ordered
progression along the scale’s points. First, the random pairs of questions assessing support for
people and government indicate that respondents rate both governments somewhat unfavorably
on average, and are neutral about both country’s people on average, suggesting that respondents
can view both Israeli and Palestinian people or their governments similarly. Second, when asked
why they supported neither overall using reasons from Inbari and Bumin (2020), the vast
majority of neutral respondents said they felt they did not know enough about the issue (Figure
1, p. 24). This suggests the midpoint of Inbari et al.’s scale may not be reliably interpreted as
representing a truly neutral position. Thus, to test my first hypotheses, overall support has been
recoded into three dummy variables (support for Israel, support for Palestine, and support for
neither) that were tested separately as dependent variables in logistic regressions.
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Figure 1. Reasons for supporting neither Israel nor Palestine

Dependent Variable 2. Jewish Stereotypes
Selznick and Steinberg (1971) measured beliefs in 24 antisemitic stereotypes relating to Jewish
dual loyalty, influence in business, government, and Christian deicide, and retained 11 items in
their final index. Today the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) incorporates these items in their biannual Survey of Attitudes Towards Jews (Anti-Defamation League, 2020). These include
stereotypes such as “Jews are more loyal to Israel than America” ; “Jews have too much power
in the United States today” ; and “Jews are responsible for the crucifixion of Christ”. The ADL
has also assessed belief in positive statements about Jewish people, and I included 2 of these
statements.
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Multiple items assess antisemitic belief about Jewish business practices or substantively
ambiguous beliefs (such as “Jews have a lot of irritating faults”), so I selected only 8 of these
items to include in my survey for clarity and to avoid redundancy. While the ADL has
respondents rate whether they believe each statement is “probably true” or “probably false,” I
expanded the response options to 5 points, forming a Likert scale that ranges from “certainly
false” (0) to “certainly true” (5), with a midpoint of “I am unsure whether this statement is true
or false” (3). This was done to better assess reliability of the measures and make their response
metrics more comparable to the measures of Christian Nationalism. All 10 statements included
in my survey and their means and standard deviations are listed in Table 4.
Table 4. Means and standard deviations for Jewish stereotype variables
Variables
Scale Mean
Jews stick together more than other Americans.
Jews always like to be at the head of things.
Jews are more loyal to Israel than America.
Jews have too much power in the business
world.
Jews have too much power in the United States
today.
Jews want to weaken our national culture by
supporting more immigrants coming to our
country.
Jewish employers go out of their way to hire
other Jews.
Jews are responsible for the crucifixion of
Christ.
Jews place a strong emphasis on the importance
of family life.a
Jews have contributed much to the cultural life
of America.a
Jews are just as honest as other businesspeople b
Note.
a These
b

SD

N

1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)

3.21

0.93

499

2.44

0.91

497

2.72

0.8

498

2.07

0.94

498

1.93

0.93

497

1.77

0.89

498

1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)
1(certainly false) to 5
(certainly true)

2.95

0.89

496

2.63

1.25

496

3.74

0.73

498

3.83

0.95

500

4.06

0.9

498

items were not included in the final additive index of Jewish stereotypes

In order to measure the stereotype referenced, that Jews are dishonest businesspeople, this variable has been reverse

coded in the final index
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The 8 statements I retained for the additive index (set to zero) had high reliability,
Crohnbach’s alpha = .83. Observed scores for the 495 valid cases range from 0 to 32 (mean =
10.48, SD = 5.08). The ADL does not publish the psychometric properties of the 11 index items
in their survey reports. Selznick and Steinberg (1971) report limited validity measures, such as
the 11 retained items’ external validity via 6 other measures of antisemitism, and the rotated
factor loadings of the original 24 items in a principal component factor analysis. Selznick and
Steinberg retained 4 factors after rotation, which they categorize as conventional antisemitism,
political antisemitism, positive stereotypes, and quasi-factual beliefs. My principal component
analysis retained two factors after rotation (X2(36) = 1457.95 ; p < .001) which explain 56.08%
of the variance for the entire set of variables (Table 5). I believe these two factors can be
straightforwardly connected to more contemporary theoretical constructions of antisemitism.
Table 5. Factor loadings of antisemitic stereotype variables (first two varimax rotated principal
components showing values > 0.500)
Variables

Jews stick together more than other Americans.
Jews are more loyal to Israel than America.
Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews.
Jews are responsible for the crucifixion of Christ.
Jews always like to be at the head of things.
Jews are just as honest as other businesspeoplea
Jews want to weaken our national culture by supporting more immigrants
coming to our country.
Jews have too much power in the business world.
Jews have too much power in the United States today.
% of Total Variance
Total Variance Explained
Note. N = 495; X2(36) = 1457.95 (p < .001)
a

Factor 1
0.06
0.29
0.35
0.42
0.66
0.73
0.76
0.83
0.83
36.75

Factor 2 Uniqueness
0.85
0.28
0.61
0.55
0.65
0.46
0.20
0.79
0.33
0.45
0.09
0.47
0.16
0.40
0.19
0.13
19.33
56.08%

0.27
0.30

This item was reverse-coded

The first factor includes statements such as Jews have too much power in the business
world; Jews have too much power in the United States today; and Jews want to weaken our
national culture by supporting more immigrants coming to our country. I believe these are
conceptually connected to the antisemitic conspiracies of Jewish world control and domination
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(Anti-Defamation League, n.d.-b; Duff, 2021). The second factor includes statements such as
“Jews stick together more than other Americans” and “Jews are more loyal to Israel than
America” which speaks to the idea that Jews are a “nation within a nation” only loyal to each
other and ultimately, Israel (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.-a; Porter-Szűcs, 2021).
Controls
A battery of controls relevant to a student population and my research questions were included to
ensure observed relationships are nonspurious. Sociodemographic controls include age in years,
a dummy variable for gender (0 = women, nonbinary and others, 1 = men), race/ethnicity
(Hispanic of any race, white [reference category], black or African American, Asian, and
multiracial or other), income (1 = “zero – $14,999” to 6 “$100,000 or more”), and type of area
growing up (rural [reference category], suburban, and urban) and region (Midwest U.S.,
Northeast, South [reference category], West, and outside the U.S.). The respondents’ university
was also included in controls. Political conservatism was controlled for by asking respondent’s
political ideology (liberal, moderate, and conservative [reference category]) and party
identification (Republican [reference category], Democrat, and Independent or other). Religious
identity was controlled for by adapting a short-form of the categories in Lehman and Sherkat’s
religious identification scheme, RELID, which categorizes Protestant denominations of
Christianity based on a ‘continuum of theological exclusivism-universalism’ (2018). The
shortened taxonomy classifies liberal Protestants, who tend to be more universal in their beliefs,
Moderate and other Protestants, Sectarians and Baptists (reference category), who tend to be
more exclusivist in their denominationalism, Catholics, other religions, and the nonreligious or
‘nones’. Religiosity was controlled for through measures of religious service attendance (0 =
never to 5 = several times a week) and prayer frequency (0 = never to 6 = several times a day).
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The religious fundamentalism of Christian respondents’ beliefs were measured via their sense of
biblical literalism (Word of God [reference category], inspired word, book of fables, and nonChristians).
Respondents who did not identify as a Christian generally or a particular denomination,
consider themselves culturally or ethnically Catholic or Mormon, or report being raised in
Catholic or Mormon households were not asked their feelings about the Bible. These cases have
not been counted as missing so that non-Christian respondents are not removed from analyses,
though this causes collinearity with other religions and/or nones. It is debatable whether the
category representing those who were not asked their feelings about the Bible is substantively
interpretable, though its significance in models could be understood as proxy for non-Christian
religions and nones. For the time being, I have erred away from interpreting model coefficients
for this category in results.
RESULTS
Survey data were analyzed in Stata 17 Standard Edition (https://www.stata.com), with assistance
from the user command packages asdocx for Stata (Shah, 2018) to construct tables, spost13 for
data analysis (Long & Freese, 2014), and the pystata package for Python (Stata.com, n.d.) for
data cleaning. The following tables include all valid cases from both survey sites (n = 471).
Overall, three multiple logistic regression models were tested for my first hypothesis, while four
multiple linear regression models were tested for the second hypotheses predicting antisemitic
beliefs.
Although principal component analysis produced two factors from the antisemitic
stereotype index, linear regression analyses used the full index. This allows for a more complete
picture of the sample’s belief in antisemitic stereotypes, as my analysis is not yet intended to
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assess differences in the types of antisemitic beliefs held by believers of Christian nationalism.
Although the sample at this stage is smaller, it is large enough to draw statistically powerful
inferences from, however results may not be generalizable to all students at either universities or
national university student populations. Significance of modeled relationships should instead be
interpreted as speaking to the strength of any observed differences. I periodically report
standardized coefficients of model variables in this section to further compare the strength of
predictors.
Hypothesis 1. Multivariate logistic regression results
Table 6 (p. 31) presents odds ratios from binary logistic regression models predicting
respondents’ support for Israel, Palestine, or neither in Israeli-Palestinian conflict overall. Sociodemographic, religious, and political controls are used in each model. All three models are
significant at the p < .001 level. The first model predicts the odds that respondents support Israel
overall. The effect of Christian nationalism is significant (OR = 0.92; p < .05), and the odds ratio
indicates that for every unit increase in the index (nineteen possible units), the likelihood that a
respondent supports Israel overall decreases by 8%. Both respondents with liberal (OR = .15; p <
.001) and moderate (OR = 0.35; p < .01) political views are significantly less likely than
conservative respondents to support Israel. Liberal respondents are 85% less likely than
conservative respondents to support Israel, and moderates are 65% less likely than conservative
respondents to support Israel overall. Hispanic respondents significantly differ from white
respondents in support for Israel (OR = 2.56; p < .05), that is, the odds that Hispanic respondents
support Israel are 2.56 times that of white respondents. Men have 2.22 times the odds of
supporting Israel compared to women, nonbinary, and other genders (OR = 2.22; p < .01).
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Fully standardized regression coefficients can be used to compare the magnitude of effect
for significant predictors in logistic regression models (Menard, 2002). The standardized
coefficients of the first model indicate that liberal ideology, relative to conservative, has a bigger
role in determining whether respondents support Israel or not overall (β = -.53). Christian
nationalism is the fourth strongest predictor of support for Israel (β = -.24), behind moderate
political views (β = -.27) and those who were not asked their feelings about the Bible (β = -.48),
although the lattermost is not a substantively interpretable category in terms of respondents’
religious fundamentalism and may instead represent the magnitude of effect for non-Christian
respondents.
Model 2 predicts probabilities of respondent’s overall support for Palestine. Christian
nationalism was not significant in predicting odds of supporting Palestine, though the odds ratio
(OR = 0.93; p > .05) was almost identical to those predicting support for Israel. The effect of
respondents having liberal political views is very significant, and the odds ratio (OR = 10.63; p <
.001) means that liberal respondents have 10.63 times the estimated odds of supporting Palestine
than conservatives. The effect of income is significant (OR = 1.51; p < .01), suggesting that as
respondents’ income increases, the odds of respondents supporting Palestine increase by 51%.
Interestingly, in the third model, Christian nationalism had a very significant effect on the
odds of respondent’s supporting neither Israel or Palestine, and the odds ratio (OR = 1.13; p <
.001) indicates that for every unit increase in the Christian nationalism index, the likelihood a
respondent supports neither state increases by 13%. This was the only significant effect at the
level of p < .001, with by far the greatest magnitude of effect (β = .43), although political
moderates and those from urban areas had greater odds of supporting neither Israel nor Palestine
than conservative and rural respondents, respectively.
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Table 6. Logistic regression analysis of overall support for Israel, Palestine, or neither
Additive CN Index
Political controlsa
Democrat
Independent or other
Politically moderate
Politically liberal
Socio-demographic controlsa
Survey site
Black or African American
Multi-racial/other
Hispanic, any race
Men
Age
Income
Midwest Region
Northeast Region
West Region
not from US
Urban
Suburban
Religious controlsa
Liberal protestants
Moderate and other Protestants
Catholics
other religions
none
Inspired word
Book of fables
Not Christianc
Church attendance
Prayer frequency
Intercept
N
LR chi2
df
Pseudo R2

Israel
(SE)

Palestine
OR
(SE)
0.93 (0.04)

1.13*** (0.04)

0.97 (0.47)
0.7 (0.24)
.35** (0.12)
0.15*** (0.07)

0.77 (0.4)
1.61 (0.72)
2.24 (1.03)
10.63*** (5.65)

1.76 (0.73)
1 (0.32)
1.93* (0.64)
1.23 (0.26)

0.5 (0.28)
0.36 (0.26)
0.8 (0.5)
2.56* (1.21)
2.22** (0.58)
1.05 (0.06)
0.92 (0.14)
1.85 (0.98)
0.94 (0.41)
0.24 (0.27)
(omitted)b
0.39 (0.26)
0.86 (0.27)

1.35 (0.73)
1.11 (0.59)
1.55 (0.71)
0.95 (0.47)
0.75 (0.2)
0.98 (0.04)
1.51** (0.23)
0.41 (0.22)
0.44 (0.21)
0.53 (0.54)
1.15 (0.87)
0.36 (0.21)
0.66 (0.22)

1.23 (0.56)
1.67 (0.82)
0.72 (0.32)
0.52 (0.22)
0.68 (0.15)
1 (0.04)
0.74 (0.12)
1.25 (0.55)
1.91 (0.71)
4.27 (3.75)
1.97 (1.34)
3.31* (1.6)
1.51 (0.43)

1.71 (0.97)
1.3 (0.53)
0.53 (0.24)
1.3 (1.08)
1.07 (0.62)
0.8 (0.33)
0.54 (0.35)
0.14** (0.1)
0.99 (0.13)
1.17 (0.11)
1.7 (2.5)
459
127.84*
27
0.23

0.48 (0.35)
1.18 (0.62)
0.92 (0.53)
1.44 (1.1)
0.9 (0.56)
1.65 (1.14)
1.46 (1.2)
2.57 (2.11)
1.02 (0.13)
0.99 (0.1)
0.13 (0.19)
471
147.88*
28
0.25

1.05 (0.58)
0.74 (0.3)
1.88 (0.8)
0.79 (0.54)
1.12 (0.56)
1.07 (0.43)
1.48 (0.85)
1.62 (0.95)
0.99 (0.11)
0.88 (0.07)
0.2 (0.25)
471
75.46*
28
0.12

OR

0.92* (0.04)

Notes. OR = Odds Ratio; Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05
a

Neither
OR
(SE)

White (race), Women, non-binary and others (gender), South (region), Rural (area), Sectarians and Baptists (religion), Word of God (feelings

about the Bible), Republican (party), and Conservative (political views) are the contrast categories.
b

12 observations predicted failure perfectly and were omitted.

c

Respondents who did not identify as Christian of any denomination or generally were not asked their feelings about the Bible. To include the

variable as a control for Christian fundamentalism, they are not counted missing. This is not an interpretable category.

The predicted probabilities of each model’s support of Israel, Palestine, or neither across
levels of support for Christian nationalism are charted in Figure 2 (p. 32) to illustrate the
relationship. In sum, these findings suggest that although Christian nationalism has a significant
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effect on the odds that respondents in the sample support Israel overall, it is in the opposite
direction than expected, leading to rejection of my first hypothesis. That said, the effect of
Christian nationalism on overall support for Israel despite religious, political, and sociodemographic controls suggest Christian nationalism is not just an effect of Christianity or
political conservativism.
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of overall support for Israel, Palestine, or neither state by score
on Christian Nationalism index

While prior survey research on Christian nationalism and support for Israel is limited,
Whitehead and Perry (2020, pp. 109–110) and Barreto and Kim (2021) suggest that Christian
nationalism is associated with a type of support for Israel that both objectifies its biblical role in
Christian theology and ports authoritarian ideals of America onto the state. The relationships of
the other covariates more closely resemble prior research findings that conservatives more often
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support Israel than liberals or moderates (Inbari et al., 2021; Pew Research Center, 2014, 2019),
as well as that more religious Christians tend to support Israel (Inbari et al., 2021). Inbari,
Bumin, and Byrd (2021) also find that younger participants in the 18 to 29 years cohort are more
likely to support neither Israel or Palestine, and considering the average age of this survey’s
college-enrolled participants (20.68 years), the higher number of neutral responses is similar to
these prior findings.
Hypothesis 2. Multivariate linear regression results
Table 7 (p. 35) presents results from multiple linear regression analyses predicting belief in
antisemitic stereotypes. The dependent variable is the antisemitism stereotype index (32 units), in
which higher scores represent greater belief in antisemitic stereotypes. Model 1 only includes
socio-demographic and religious variables. Results indicate that when controlling for other
sociodemographic and religious factors, Black respondents score 2.93 (p < .01) units higher on
average for the antisemitic stereotype index than white respondents, and men score 1 unit higher
than women, nonbinary and other respondents (p < .05). In terms of religious predictors, when
controlling for other religious and socio-demographic predictors, liberal Protestants score on
average, 3.3 units lower on the antisemitic index than sectarian and Baptist respondents (p < .01),
moderate and other Protestants respondents score 1.68 units lower on the antisemitic stereotype
index than Sectarians and Baptists (p < .05). On average, those who believe the Bible is a book
of fables score 3.41 points lower than those who believe it is the literal word of God (p < .01),
and as respondents pray more frequently, their scores increase by .36 units (p < .05).
Model 2 includes controls for political party and ideology which improves the overall
model fit, and while all previously significant predictors wash out except respondents’ race being
Black and being a part of a liberal Protestant denomination, a few newly significant predictors
33

are noteworthy. Respondents who are politically moderate and liberal score 2.61 and 5.08 units
less on the antisemitic index than political conservatives, respectively (p < .001). The effect the
survey site became significant (p < .05), with scores on the antisemitic index for respondents at
the second university being 1.97 units higher than at the first university. This effect is not
significant in the other models and is likely spurious.
Model 3 adds Christian nationalism, which has a significant positive relationship with
respondents’ scores on the antisemitic stereotype index (p < .001). Net of sociodemographic,
religious, and political controls, for every unit increase in the Christian nationalism index (19
units), respondents’ scores on the antisemitism stereotype index increase by .43 units. The
significance of moderate respondents’ political views relative to conservatives lessens (p < .01).
On average, respondents who grew up in suburban areas score 1.2 units higher on the antisemitic
index than those who grew up in rural areas (p < .05).
Model 4 introduces respondent’s support of Palestine or neither state compared to Israel,
since I hypothesized belief in Christian nationalism would be associated with antisemitic belief
regardless of whether respondents support Israel. Coefficients of this model largely mirror Model
3, and the indicator variables for Palestine and neither are nonsignificant. Both models 3 and 4
suggest that controlling for all other factors, the more a respondent believes Christian
nationalism, the more likely they are to believe antisemitic stereotypes. The interaction of
support in Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Christian nationalism were tested, but since increase in
R-squared between Model 4 and the interaction model was nominal, little explanatory value
power is gained, thus the interaction was dropped. Standardized coefficients for Model 4 indicate
Christian nationalism (β = .38) is tied for strongest predictor of belief in antisemitic stereotypes
in the model with liberal political views (β = -.38), albeit in opposite directions.
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Table 7. Linear regression analysis of respondent scores on additive antisemitic stereotype index
b

Model 1
(SE)

Additive CN Index
Israeli-Palestinian Supporta
Support Palestine
Support Neither
Political controlsa
Democrat
Independent or other
Politically moderate
Politically liberal
Socio-demographic controlsa
Survey site
1.33 (0.98)
Black or African
2.93** (1.04)
American
Multi-racial/other
1.44 (0.94)
Hispanic, any race
0.39 (0.92)
Men
1* (0.47)
Age
-0.06 (0.09)
Income
0.38 (0.29)
Midwest Region
0.24 (0.96)
Northeast Region
1.09 (0.81)
West Region
2.09 (1.78)
not from US
1.24 (1.46)
Urban
0.59 (1.04)
Suburban
0.65 (0.6)
Religious controlsa
Liberal protestants
-3.3** (1.26)
Moderate and other
-1.68* (0.85)
Protestants
Catholics
-0.71 (0.92)
other religions
-1.35 (1.42)
none
-1.69 (1.08)
Inspired word
-1.57 (0.83)
Book of fables
-3.41** (1.17)
Not Christianb
-2.6* (1.19)
Church attendance
-0.24 (0.23)
Prayer frequency
0.35* (0.17)
Intercept
11.01*** (2.51)
N
471
F-score
3.59*
df
(23, 447)
R2
0.16

b

Model 2
(SE)

b

Model 3
(SE)

0.42*** (0.07)

Model 4
(SE)

0.4*** (0.07)
0.35 (0.62)
0.95 (0.54)

0.07 (0.81)
-0.38 (0.64)
-2.62*** (0.66)
-5.11*** (0.82)

.98 (0.79)
0.36 (0.62)
-2.08** (0.64)
-3.86*** (0.81)

0.9 (0.79)
0.34 (0.62)
-2.24** (0.65)
-3.91*** (0.84)

1.97* (0.92)

1.72 (0.89)

1.66 (0.88)

3.27** (1)

3.2** (0.96)

3.09** (0.96)

1.3 (0.89)
0.86 (0.87)
0.28 (0.45)
-0.01 (0.08)
0.24 (0.28)
-0.14 (0.9)
0.08 (0.77)
1.63 (1.68)
0.97 (1.37)
1.1 (0.98)
1 (0.57)

1.29 (0.85)
0.8 (0.83)
0.5 (0.44)
0.02 (0.08)
0.26 (0.27)
-0.32 (0.86)
0.22 (0.74)
1.76 (1.61)
0.16 (1.32)
1.06 (0.94)
1.2* (0.55)

1.31 (0.85)
0.94 (0.83)
0.58 (0.44)
0.02 (0.08)
0.29 (0.27)
-0.31 (0.87)
0.13 (0.74)
1.51 (1.61)
0.01 (1.32)
0.87 (0.94)
1.15* (0.55)

-2.54* (1.1)

-2.25* (1.01)

-2.23* (1.05)

-1.1 (0.8)

-1.12 (0.76)

-1.08 (0.76)

-0.59 (0.87)
-0.71 (1.36)
-1.24 (1.02)
0.06 (0.81)
-0.83 (1.15)
-0.00 (1.17)
-0.25 (0.22)
0.14 (0.16)
10.73*** (2.36)
471
5.91*
(27, 443)
0.26

-0.61 (0.83)
-.23 (1.3)
-0.68 (0.98)
0.3 (0.78)
-0.06 (1.11)
0.71 (1.13)
-0.3 (0.21)
-0.09 (0.16)
6.12* (2.37)
471
7.69*
(28, 442)
0.33

-0.74 (0.83)
-0.2 (1.3)
-0.07 (0.98)
0.27 (0.78)
-0.15 (1.11)
0.57 (1.13)
-0.3 (0.21)
-0.06 (0.16)
5.9* (2.38)
471
7.32*
(30, 440)
0.33

Notes. b = unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05
a

b

White (race), Women, non-binary and others (gender), South (region), Rural (area), Sectarians and Baptists (religion), Word of God

(feelings about the Bible), Republican (party), and Conservative (political views) are the contrast categories.
b

Respondents who did not identify as Christian of any denomination or generally were not asked their feelings about the Bible. To

include the variable as a control for Christian fundamentalism, they are not counted missing. This is not an interpretable category.
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In sum, these linear regression analyses demonstrate that respondents who hold stronger
Christian nationalist beliefs tend to believe more antisemitic stereotypes, and those with liberal
political views are less likely to believe such stereotypes. Results of Model 4 confirm my
hypothesis that as respondents score more highly on the Christian nationalism index, they will
believe more antisemitic stereotypes about Jewish people than those with lower scores,
regardless of their support for Israel.
DISCUSSION
This research is builds upon three core ideas from prior research and theory. First, Christian
nationalism, as an ideology, serves to ensure adherents perceived hierarchical ethnic and racial
boundaries that prioritize white Christian Americans and limit civic and national belonging of
others (Baker et al., 2020b; Dahab & Omori, 2019; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018; Perry &
Whitehead, 2015a). Second, American Christian Zionism, or support of modern-day Israel, is
often based on desire for similarly authoritarian political leaders in the U.S. (Durbin, 2018;
O’Donnell, 2021) and/or reductive conceptualizations of Judaism, Jews, and Israel as utilitarian
signifiers of biblical prophecy (Durbin, 2018; Inbari et al., 2021; O’Donnell, 2021), which serves
to other and racialize diasporic Jews. Third, both of these factors strengthen nationalist and
racialized antisemitism against Jewish diaspora, which is often expressed as stereotypes and
conspiracies about Jewish power, control, and infiltration (Duff, 2021; Porter-Szűcs, 2021).
I hypothesized that more strongly adhering to Christian nationalism would be associated
with supporting Israel overall in modern-day Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Results of these
analyses were inconsistent with my expectation and prior research (Barreto & Kim, 2021;
Whitehead & Perry, 2020), instead suggesting that greater adherence to Christian nationalism is
weakly associated with decreased odds that respondents support Israel, and more strongly

36

associated with increased odds of supporting neither Israel nor Palestine. These relationships are
present even with relevant socio-demographic, religious, and political controls. Since the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is often framed as a conflict between Muslims and Jews, these findings may
suggest a more isolationist desire of Christian nationalism, where the U.S. supports neither state
of ethnoracial outsiders. Another possible explanation for my contrasting findings could be this
skew towards neutral responses, when as shown in Figure 1 (p. 24), rather than feeling neutral
towards both Israel and Palestine, most respondents did not feel informed enough to take a stance
on the conflict. This lack of knowledge could be associated with the sample population, being
younger adults, overwhelmingly U.S.-born college students. Inbari and Bumin (2020, p. 625)
suggest another explanation for neutral responses among Evangelical Christians; Some Christian
respondents may select neutrality out of their belief that they are not in a position to affect the
will of God concerning the End Days or time of Revelations. Whether this explanation is true of
neutral believers of Christian nationalism is still unanswered.
My second hypothesis predicted that stronger adherence to Christian nationalism, as a
means of enforcing exclusivist religious, racial, and ethnic boundaries, would be associated with
belief in antisemitic stereotypes, even if respondents support Israel, a potential indicator of
Christian Zionist belief. The results of my analyses were consistent with my expectation in this
case, supporting that even when controlling for relevant socio-demographic, religious, and
political predictors, as well as respondents’ support for Israel, greater adherence to Christian
nationalism is strongly associated with more antisemitic beliefs. These findings suggest that for
believers of Christian nationalism, religious and ethnoracial boundaries with Jews are maintained
through antisemitic rhetoric that promotes myths of dual loyalty and Jewish world control.
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Limitations
There are a few important methodological limitations to consider with this research. First, data
used were collected only the first 2 weeks of response collection (February 15th through March
1st, 2022), resulting in a smaller sample size, which may adversely affect the reliability of
coefficients for more disaggregated variables in models. I often resorted to collapsing response
categories where differences may be substantively important due to having too few responses
(e.g., Jews and Muslims being counted together as ‘other’ religious identities). Second, since my
sampling frame was constructed using simple random sampling of students at two universities, it
is likely the sample is not representative of either student populations in terms of sociodemographic traits or college students nationally. Respondents are overwhelmingly white and
Christian in my sample. I will be using the complete data, collected from February 15th through
March 15th, in future research, which may account for some of the issues posed by the present
sample size and characteristics. Other researchers should aim to replicate these results on a larger
sample, ideally representative of the U.S. adult population. Additionally, support for Israel is just
one potential indicator of Zionism, and future research should test additional measures of
Christian Zionism, such as Christian eschatological beliefs concerning Israel (Inbari et al., 2021;
Rosenberg, 2017) and support for Israeli government leaders and policies.
Conclusions and suggestions for future research
Limitations notwithstanding, my research has taken a step towards expanding the research of
American Christian nationalism with respect to geopolitics, Christian Zionism, and antisemitism.
My findings appear to contrast prior research suggesting that adherents of Christian nationalism
would tend to support Israel (Barreto & Kim, 2021; Whitehead & Perry, 2020), suggesting that
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stronger adherents of Christian nationalism may in fact be significantly more likely to support
neither Israel nor Palestine. This may suggest Christian nationalism does not have as much
ideological overlap with Christian Zionism as previously thought. Future research should explore
if particular motivations for support for Israel, such as support for its leaders, role in biblical
prophecies, or anti-Muslim sentiments, are similarly or differently associated with both Christian
Zionism and nationalism.
My research also demonstrates strong positive associations between Christian nationalist
belief and antisemitism, which is supported by prior research by Whitehead and Perry finding
that adherents of Christian nationalism view Jewish people as a threat (2020, p. 110) and
research by Djupe and Dennen (2021) finding significant associations between Christian
nationalism, QAnon conspiracy, and several of the same measures of antisemitic stereotypes
used in my study. This affirms the larger body of literature finding support for Christian
nationalism’s maintenance of exclusive national and civic identity based on strict religious and
ethnoracial boundaries. Future research should aim to incorporate a more recent and larger
variety of measures of antisemitism, such as the AzAs scale of Anti-Zionist antisemitism
(Allington & Hirsh, 2019), to allow for more comprehensive understandings of the types of
antisemitic rhetoric engaged within Christian Zionism and nationalism.
Overall, my research serves as a successful pilot study bringing together measures of
three constructs theorized to be associated, though prior quantitative research had yet to address
wholistically. The continued testing and improvement of these measures for Christian
nationalism, Zionism, and antisemitism should be of interest to scholars of each. This thesis
should make clear the importance of understanding the association of Christian nationalism with
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all forms of exclusivist and prejudicial beliefs, as my findings suggest that these prejudicial
beliefs inform the political positions adherents of Christian nationalism take.
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Appendix A. Qualtrics Survey

Start of Block: Informed Consent
Survey: Clemson University Thesis Research
My name is Jessica Liberman. I am a graduate student in the department of Sociology,
Anthropology, and Criminal Justice at Clemson University. I am asking you to participate in my
research study. The purpose of my study is to better understand college students' perceptions
of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, their general political views, and religious values.
The minimum age to participate is 18 years of age. Participation is voluntary, and you have the
option to not participate. There is no penalty for not participating or for withdrawing from the
study. If you want to withdraw, you can close your browser at any time. You may stop and
continue the survey at a later point in time. The survey will be accessible until 11:59PM EST,
March 15th, 2022.
If you choose to participate in the study, it will take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time.
You will answer survey questions related to political views on various topics including IsraeliPalestinian conflict and United States politics, your sociodemographic traits and religious
values. Some questions require response in order to determine your eligibility to participate in
the study, and will be indicated as such, but otherwise you may skip questions that you would
prefer not to answer.
We do not know of any risks or discomforts to you in this research study. There are no direct
benefits to you for participating, aside from an opportunity to enter into a drawing for a monetary
incentive upon completion of the survey. However, your contribution will help advance our
broader understanding of how college students engage with geo-politics.
Incentives
At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would like to enter into a random drawing for
one of either fifteen (15) $15 or five (5) $50 gift cards. Having your name entered into this
drawing is conditional upon completing the survey. Names and emails will be voluntarily
collected in a separate form and will not be linked to your survey response.
Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality
No identifiable information will be collected in this survey. Any volunteered names and email
addresses will be kept on file until the completion of data collection and distribution of the gift
cards. After this, identifiable data will be deleted.
The results of this study may be published in scientific journals, professional publications, or
educational presentations. Published results will be aggregated and de-identified, meaning
survey responses can not be connected to any individuals. All your responses will be kept
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confidential within reasonable limits. Only those directly involved with this project will have
access to the data. I will take all reasonable steps to protect your identity.
We might be required to share the information we collect from you with the Clemson University
Office of Research Compliance and the federal Office for Human Research Protections. If this
happens, the information would only be used to find out if we ran this study properly and
protected your rights as a participant.
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:
Jessica Liberman, Clemson University
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberm@clemson.edu
Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026
Thank you for taking the time to assist me with this research.
By clicking the NEXT ARROW below, I affirm that I am 18 years of age and voluntarily
consent to participate in this survey on ${date://CurrentDate/SL}.
This project has been reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Institutional Review
Board. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to
the committee chairperson, Clemson Centre, 391 College Avenue, Suite 406, Clemson, SC
29631. Phone (864) 656-0636. E-mail: irb@clemson.edu

End of Block: Informed Consent
Start of Block: screen
Q2.1 Are you a current undergraduate student at a U.S. college or university?

o Yes
o No
End of Block: screen
Start of Block: site_id
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Q2.2 Which university do you attend for undergraduate studies?
Select from dropdown menu

o Clemson University
o South Carolina State University
o Southern Illinois University Carbondale
o University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana
o University of Nevada Reno
o University of Texas Austin
o Tarleton State University
o None of these
End of Block: site_id
Start of Block: ME support gov

Q4a The following questions are about your political beliefs generally, and regarding current
issues.
Thinking about the situation between Israel and Palestine these days… Do you have a
favorable or unfavorable opinion of each of the following?
Very
unfavorable

Neither
favorable or
unfavorable

Somewhat
unfavorable

Somewhat
favorable

Very
favorable

The Israeli
government

o

o

o

o

o

The
Palestinian
government

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: ME support gov
Start of Block: ME support people
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Q4b The following questions are about your political beliefs generally, and regarding current
issues.
Thinking about the situation between Israel and Palestine these days… Do you have a
favorable or unfavorable opinion of each of the following?
Very
unfavorable

Neither
favorable or
unfavorable

Somewhat
unfavorable

Somewhat
favorable

Very
favorable

The Israeli
people

o

o

o

o

o

The
Palestinian
people

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: ME support people
Start of Block: ME overall support

Q5 Considering the situation between Israel and Palestine overall, where do you place your
support?

o Very Strong support for Palestinians
o Support Palestinians
o Lean toward support for Palestinians
o Support Neither
o Lean toward support for Israel
o Support Israel
o Very Strong support for Israel
End of Block: ME overall support
Start of Block: Israeli support
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Q5.1b Do you agree or disagree with the following reasons for supporting Israel?
Strongly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Strongly
agree

I support
Israel
because of
my shared
political or
democratic
values.

o

o

o

o

o

I support
Israel
because of
my shared
cultural
and/or
religious
values.

o

o

o

o

o

I support
Israel
because
Jews suffered
discrimination
and
extermination
at the hands
of other
nations in the
past.

o

o

o

o

o

I support
Israel
because a
thriving State
of Israel is
vital for the
long-term
future of the
Jewish
people.

o

o

o

o

o

I support
Israel
because its
existence is

o

o

o

o

o
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proof of the
fulfillment of
prophesy
regarding the
nearing of
Jesus’
Second
Coming.
I support
Israel
because
Jews are
God’s chosen
people.

o

o

o

o

o

Israel needs
to build a
temple for
God on the
Temple
Mount in the
near future.

o

o

o

o

o

I support
Israel
because it
protects the
holy sites and
is the only
guarantor of
Christian
access to
them.

o

o

o

o

o

Page Break
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Q5.2b In what ways, if any, have you expressed your support for Israel?
Select all that apply

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

I have sympathized with Israel
I have expressed my support of Israel to friends
I have expressed my support of Israel on social media
I have made donations to pro-Israel causes
I have contacted my representatives in order to support Israel
I voted for representatives who pledged to support Israel
None of these, I have not expressed my support for Israel

Other Please explain
________________________________________________
End of Block: Israeli support
Start of Block: Palestinian support

57

Q5.1a Which, if any, of the following are reasons for having little or no support for Israel?
Select all that apply

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

Israel’s policy towards Palestinians
Israel’s settlements built in the Palestinian territories
Israel’s military occupation of Palestinians
Jews are a privileged group who oppress the Palestinians
I oppose Israel and its policies for religious reasons

Other Please explain
________________________________________________

Page Break
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Q5.2a In what ways, if any, have you expressed your support for Palestine?
Select all that apply

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

I have sympathized with Palestinians and pro-Palestinian sentiments
I have expressed my support of Palestinians to friends
I have expressed my support of Palestinians on social media
I have made donations to pro-Palestinian causes
I have contacted my representatives in order to support Palestinians
I voted for representatives who pledged to support Palestinians

I have joined or supported an organization(s) that pledges to boycott, divest from
or sanction Israel (e.g. BDS movement)

▢
▢

None of these, I have not expressed my support for Palestine

Other Please explain
________________________________________________
End of Block: Palestinian support
Start of Block: No support
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Q5.1c Which, if any, of the following are your reasons for supporting neither Israel or Palestine?
Select all that apply

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

I do not want to pick a side
Both of them deserve support
Neither of them deserve support
I do not know enough about the dispute

Other Please explain
________________________________________________
End of Block: No support
Start of Block: Political Views
Q9.2 Do you think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist
peacefully with each other?

o No, cannot coexist peacefully
o Yes, can coexist peacefully
Page Break
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Q9.3 Which of the following best describes your views on American involvement in Israel?

o The U.S. does not do enough to help Israel
o The U.S. is doing the right amount to help Israel
o The U.S. does too much to help Israel
Page Break

Q9.4 About how often do you hear others expressing the importance of supporting Israel and/or
Palestine?
Support
expressed for
Israel

oweek
Every

omonth
Once a

o Seldom

o Never

Support
expressed for
Palestine

oweek
Every

omonth
Once a

o Seldom

o Never

Page Break
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Q9.5 Which of the following have influenced your opinions about the current issues between
Israel and Palestine?
Select up to three (3) most influential.

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

Teachers or professors
Media coverage
Friends and family
Your faith’s religious texts
Your local church
Personal experiences with Muslim people
Personal experiences with Jewish people
Religious leaders of your faith
Religious leaders of other faiths
Positions of elected officials

Something else, please specify
________________________________________________

Page Break
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Q9.6 Compared to a year ago, is the climate on your college campus less hostile or more
hostile toward pro-Israel students?

o Less hostile than a year ago
o About the same as a year ago
o More hostile than a year ago
Page Break

Q9.7 In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

o Very liberal
o Liberal
o Moderate
o Conservative
o Very Conservative
Page Break
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Q9.8 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?

o Democrat
o Republican
o Independent
o
Something else, please specify
________________________________________________
End of Block: Political Views
Start of Block: Culture
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Q10.1 Next, we have some questions about groups of people in the United States.
How much discrimination do you think there is against each of the following groups in the United
States today?
None at all
Black people
Hispanic people
White people
Transgender
people, that is
people who
identify as a
gender that is
different from
the sex they
were assigned
at birth
Lesbian, gay, or
bisexual people
Jewish people
Muslim people
Evangelical
Christians

Only a little

Some
discrimination

A lot of
discrimination

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o

o

o

o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

Page Break
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Q10.3 Suppose there were a fundamental conflict between the national interest of Israel and
that of the United States--do you think that most Jewish-Americans would probably back Israel
or the United States?

o Probably back United States
o Probably back Israel
Page Break
Q10.4 Do you feel that Jewish-Americans are too inclined to defend Israel even when they
disagree with its policies, or do you feel that Jewish-Americans are willing to criticize Israel
when they disagree with its policies?

o Jewish-Americans are too inclined to defend Israel
o Jewish-Americans do criticize Israel
End of Block: Culture
Start of Block: Christian nationalism

Q3 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Strongly
disagree
The United
States
Supreme
Court has
ruled that no
state or local
government
may require
the reading of
the Lord's
Prayer or
Bible verses
in public
schools. Do
you agree or

o

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
disagree

o

o
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Somewhat
agree

o

Strongly
agree

o

disagree with
the court
ruling?
The federal
government
should allow
the display of
religious
symbols in
public
spaces.

o

o

o

o

o

The federal
government
should
enforce strict
separation of
church and
state.

o

o

o

o

o

The federal
government
should
advocate
Christian
values.

o

o

o

o

o

The success
of the United
States is part
of God’s
plan.

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Christian nationalism
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Start of Block: Jewish stereotypes

Q11 Below is a list of statements about Jews, including several that were made many years
ago. Do you think that the following statements are probably true or probably false?
Certainly
false

I am
uncertain
whether this
is true or
false

Probably
false

Probably
true

Certainly
true

Jews stick
together more
than other
Americans.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews always
like to be at the
head of things.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews are more
loyal to Israel
than America.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews have too
much power in
the business
world.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews have too
much power in
the United
States today.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews want to
weaken our
national culture
by supporting
more
immigrants
coming to our
country.

o

o

o

o

o

Jewish
employers go
out of their way
to hire other
Jews.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews are
responsible for

o

o

o

o

o
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the crucifixion
of Christ.
Jews place a
strong
emphasis on
the importance
of family life.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews have
contributed
much to the
cultural life of
America.

o

o

o

o

o

Jews are just
as honest as
other
businesspeople

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Jewish stereotypes
Start of Block: Demographics

Q12.2 Next, we have some questions about you.
What is your age, in years?
________________________________________________________________

Page Break
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Q12.3 What is your classification in college?

o Freshman/first-year
o Sophomore
o Junior
o Senior
o Unclassified
Page Break

Q12.6 What racial or ethnic group best describes you?

o White or Caucasian
o Black or African-American
o Hispanic or Latino/Latina
o Asian, Asian-American, Pacific Islander, or South Asian
o Indigenous or Native American
o Middle Eastern
o two or more races
o other, please specify ________________________________________________
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q12.6 = two or more races

Q12.7 Which racial or ethnic groups best describe you?
Select all that apply

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

White or Caucasian
Black or African-American
Hispanic or Latino/Latina
Asian or Asian-American
Indigenous or Native American
Middle Eastern

other, please specify
________________________________________________

Page Break
Display This Question:
If Q12.6 != Hispanic or Latino/Latina
And If
Q12.7 != Hispanic or Latino/Latina

Q12.8 Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?

o Yes
o No
Page Break
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Q12.4 Have you ever undergone any part of a process (including any thought or action) to
change your gender / perceived gender from the one you were assigned at birth?
This may include steps such as changing the type of clothes you wear, name you are known by
or undergoing surgery.

o Yes
o No
o Prefer not to say
Page Break
Q12.5 What is your gender?

o Man
o Woman
o Non-binary
o other, please specify ________________________________________________
o Prefer not to say
Page Break
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Q12.13 Which of the following best describes your sexuality?

o Heterosexual / straight
Display This Choice:
If Q12.5 != Man

o Lesbian / gay woman
Display This Choice:
If Q12.5 != Woman

o Gay man
o Bisexual
o other, please specify ________________________________________________
o Prefer not to say
Page Break
Q12.9 Currently, about how many hours per week do you spend working on a job for pay?

o None
o 1-10 hours a week
o 11-20 hours a week
o 21-30 hours a week
o 31-40 hours a week
o 40 or more hours a week
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q12.9 = None

Q12.10 Which of the following best describes why you do not currently work a job for pay?

o Focusing on academic studies
o Temporarily laid off
o Taking care of home or family
o Permanently disabled
o Retired
o
Something else, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break

Q12.11 Thinking back over the last year, what was your individual annual income?

o zero – $14,999
o $15,000–$29,999
o $30,000–$44,999
o $45,000–$59,000
o $60,000–$99,999
o $100,000 or more
Page Break
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Q12.12 What is your marital status?

o Married
o Separated
o Divorced
o Widowed
o Never married
o Domestic / civil partnership
Page Break
Q12.14 Are you the parent or guardian of any children under the age of 18?

o Yes
o No
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q12.12 != Never married
Or Q12.14 = Yes

Q12.15 Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

o zero – $14,999
o $15,000–$29,999
o $30,000–$44,999
o $45,000–$59,999
o $60,000 - $99,999
o $100,000 or more
Page Break
Q12.16 Which of the following best describes the area you grew up or spent the majority of your
life in?

o Urban
o Suburban
o Rural
Page Break
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Q12.17 Are you a citizen of the United States?

o Yes
o No
o Prefer not to say
Page Break
End of Block: Demographics
Start of Block: Citizen
Q12.18 Which of these statements best describes you?

o I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen.
o I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant.
o
My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an
immigrant.
o My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA.
Display This Choice:
If Q12.17 = Prefer not to say

o I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen.
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q12.18 != I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen.
And Q12.18 != I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen.

Q12.19 Which U.S. state are you from? You may either use abbreviations (e.g., AL, MI, IL) or
the full name of the state.
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Citizen
Start of Block: Religious Behaviors & Attitudes

Q13.1 How important is religion in your life?

o Not at all important
o Not too important
o Somewhat important
o Very important
Page Break
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Q13.2 Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

o Never
o Seldom
o A few times a year
o Once or twice a month
o Once a week
o More than once a week
Page Break

Q13.3 People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services,
how often do you pray?

o Never
o Seldom
o A few times a month
o Once a week
o A few times a week
o Once a day
o Several times a day
Page Break
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Q13.4 What is your present religion, if any?

o Protestant
o Roman Catholic
o Mormon
o Eastern or Greek Orthodox
o Jewish
o Muslim
o Buddhist
o Hindu
o Atheist
o Agnostic
o Nothing in particular
o
Something else, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Protestant

Q13.5 To which Protestant church or group do you belong?

o Baptist
o Methodist
o Independent Church
o Lutheran
o Presbyterian
o Pentecostal
o Episcopalian
o Church of Christ or Disciples of Christ
o Congregational or United Church of Christ
o Holiness
o Reformed
o Adventist
o Jehovah's Witness
o Nondenominational
o
Something else, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Roman Catholic

Q13.6
To which Catholic church do you belong?

o Roman Catholic Church
o National Polish Catholic Church
o Greek-rite Catholic
o Armenian Catholic
o Old Catholic
o
Other Catholic, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Mormon

Q13.7 To which Mormon church do you belong?

o The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
o Community of Christ
o
Other Mormon, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Eastern or Greek Orthodox

Q13.8 To which Orthodox church do you belong?

o Greek Orthodox
o Russian Orthodox
o Orthodox Church in America
o Armenian Orthodox
o Eastern Orthodox
o Serbian Orthodox
o
Other Orthodox, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Jewish

Q13.9 To which Jewish group do you belong?

o Reform
o Conservative
o Orthodox
o Reconstructionist
o
Other Jewish, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Muslim

Q13.10 To which Muslim group do you belong?

o Sunni
o Shia
o Nation of Islam (Black Muslim)
o
Other Muslim, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Buddhist

Q13.11 To which Buddhist group do you belong?

o Theravada (Vipassana) Buddhism
o Mahayana (Zen) Buddhism
o Vajrayana (Tibetan) Buddhism
o
Other Buddhist, please specify
________________________________________________
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Hindu

Q13.12 With which of the following Hindu groups, if any, do you

identify with most closely?

o Vaishnava Hinduism
o Shaivite Hinduism
o Shaktism Hinduism
o Other Hindu, please specify ________________________________________________
Page Break
Display This Question:
If If relig Text Response Is Not Empty
Or If
Q13.4 = Nothing in particular

Q13.13 Do you think of yourself as a Christian, whether religiously or spiritually or not?

o Yes, think of self as Christian
o No, do not think of self as Christian
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Protestant
Or Q13.4 = Roman Catholic
Or Q13.4 = Mormon
Or Q13.4 = Eastern or Greek Orthodox
Or If
Q13.13 = Yes, think of self as Christian

Q13.14 Would you describe yourself as a "born-again" or evangelical Christian, or not?

o Yes, born-again or evangelical Christian
o No, not born-again or evangelical Christian
Page Break
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Q13.15 Aside from religion, do you consider yourself to be any of the following in any way? For
example you may identify ethnically, culturally or because of your family’s background.
Select all that apply.
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Jewish
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Roman Catholic
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Mormon
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Muslim

Yes, consider myself this
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Jewish

Jewish
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Roman Catholic

Catholic
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Mormon

Mormon
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Muslim

Muslim

No, do not consider myself
this

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Page Break
Carry Forward Unselected Choices from "Q13.15"
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Q13.16 Please indicate whether you were raised in any of the following traditions or had a
parent from any of the following backgrounds.
Select all that apply.
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Jewish
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Roman Catholic
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Mormon
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Muslim

Yes, was raised in this
tradition or had a parent from
this background
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Jewish

Jewish
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Roman Catholic

Catholic
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Mormon

Mormon
Display This Choice:
If Q13.4 != Muslim

Muslim

No, was not raised in this
tradition and did not have a
parent from this background

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Protestant
Or Q13.4 = Roman Catholic
Or Q13.4 = Mormon
Or Q13.4 = Eastern or Greek Orthodox
Or If
Q13.13 = Yes, think of self as Christian
Or If
Q13.15 = Catholic [ Yes, consider myself this ]
Or Q13.15 = Mormon [ Yes, consider myself this ]
Or If
If relraised Catholic - Yes, was raised in this tradition or had a parent from this background Is
Selected
Or Or relraised Mormon - Yes, was raised in this tradition or had a parent from this background Is
Selected

Q13.17 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Bible is the highest
authority for what I believe.

o Strongly disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Somewhat agree
o Strongly agree
Page Break
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Display This Question:
If Q13.4 = Protestant
Or Q13.4 = Roman Catholic
Or Q13.4 = Mormon
Or Q13.4 = Eastern or Greek Orthodox
Or If
Q13.13 = Yes, think of self as Christian
Or If
Q13.15 = Catholic [ Yes, consider myself this ]
Or Q13.15 = Mormon [ Yes, consider myself this ]
Or If
If relraised Catholic - Yes, was raised in this tradition or had a parent from this background Is
Selected
Or Or relraised Mormon - Yes, was raised in this tradition or had a parent from this background Is
Selected

Q13.18 Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?

o The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
o
The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally,
word for word.
o
The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by
man.
End of Block: Religious Behaviors & Attitudes
Start of Block: Closing

Q14.1 Do you have any additional thoughts about this survey or your answers? Please share
them below. If not, this question may be skipped.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Page Break
Q14.2 Are you interested in entering into a random drawing for one of fifteen (15) $15 gift cards,
or one of five (5) $50 gift cards? Your response will still remain anonymous.
If you answer yes, once you click next you will be directed to another survey to enter the
drawing.

o Yes, I would like to be entered into the drawing.
o No, take me to the end of the survey.
End of Block: Closing
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Appendix B. Survey invitation and follow-up emails
Subject: Invitation to Participate in Thesis Research: Students' Opinions on U.S. in Global
Politics
Dear ${m://FirstName},
My name is Jessica Liberman. I am a graduate student in the department of Sociology,
Anthropology, and Criminal Justice at Clemson University, and I am inviting you to participate
in my thesis research. The purpose of my study is to better understand college students'
perceptions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, their general political views, and religious values.
You were randomly selected to participate in this study due to your enrollment at
${m://ExternalDataReference}. The minimum age to participate is 18 years of age. Participation
is voluntary, meaning there is no penalty for not participating or for withdrawing from the study.
If you choose to participate in the study, it will take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time,
and you may stop and continue the survey at a later time. You will answer survey questions
related to social and political views on various topics including Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
United States politics, your demographic characteristics, and your religious values.
At the end of the survey, you will have an opportunity to enter a random drawing for one of
fifteen (15) $15 or one of five (5) $50 Amazon gift cards. Entering this drawing is conditional
upon completing the survey.
Follow this link to the Survey:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey}
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:

Jessica Liberman, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberm@clemson.edu
Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026

Thank you for taking the time to assist me with this research.
--

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Institutional Review Board. Questions concerning your rights
as a participant in this research may be addressed to the committee chairperson, Clemson Centre, 391 College Avenue, Suite 406,
Clemson, SC 29631. Phone (864) 656-0636. E-mail: irb@clemson.edu
You can always contact me if you would like to: review, change or delete the data you have supplied us with (to the extent I am not
otherwise permitted or required to keep such data); receive a copy of your data; ask me questions related to the protection of your data;
or lodge a complaint. You may view the data management plan for this survey by following this link. If you have any questions, please
contact: (Name: Jessica Liberman, Email: jliberm@clemson.edu)
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You will be contacted again with this request two (2) more times during the next four (4) weeks. If you would prefer not to be contacted
again: ${l://OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe}

Subject: Help a Graduate Researcher Understand Student Opinions on Israel-Palestine Conflict
Dear ${m://FirstName},
Earlier in February I emailed you regarding my thesis research in the Department of Sociology,
Anthropology, and Criminal Justice at Clemson University. The purpose of my study is to better
understand college students' perceptions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as opinions about
U.S. politics, various social groups, and how these opinions may inform or affect one another. If
you have already taken the survey, thank you, and you may disregard this email.
If you have not yet completed the survey, I hope that providing a link to it below will allow
you to respond more easily:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Click here to take the Survey}
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}
If you choose to participate in the study, it will take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time.
If you've already started the survey, you will be able to continue from where you left off. Your
participation will help contribute to our broader understanding of how students form opinions on
current events and how they share those opinions with others.
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:

Jessica Liberman, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberm@clemson.edu
Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026

Your response is voluntary, and I thank you for considering my request.
Jessica Liberman
--

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Institutional Review Board. Questions concerning your rights
as a participant in this research may be addressed to the committee chairperson, Clemson Centre, 391 College Avenue, Suite 406,
Clemson, SC 29631. Phone (864) 656-0636. E-mail: irb@clemson.edu
You can always contact me if you would like to: review, change or delete the data you have supplied us with (to the extent I am not
otherwise permitted or required to keep such data); receive a copy of your data; ask me questions related to the protection of your data;
or lodge a complaint. You may view the data management plan for this survey by following this link. If you have any questions, please
contact: (Name: Jessica Liberman, Email: jliberm@clemson.edu)
If you would prefer not to be contacted again: ${l://OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe}
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Subject: Last Chance to Help in Thesis Research!
Dear ${m://FirstName},
I'm writing to follow up on the message I sent in February asking if you would participate in my
survey of U.S. university students' perceptions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as their
opinions about U.S. politics and various social groups. This survey closes tomorrow, on March
15th, and this is the last reminder I will be sending about the study.
The survey link is provided below:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Click here to take the Survey}
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}
As a thank you for your time and answers, at the end of the survey, you will have an opportunity
to enter into a random drawing for one of fifteen (15) $15 or one of five (5) $50 Amazon gift
cards.
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:

Jessica Liberman, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberm@clemson.edu
Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026

Thank you for taking the time to assist me with this research, and I wish you an enjoyable rest of
your semester.
Sincerely,
Jessica Liberman
--

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Institutional Review Board. Questions concerning your rights
as a participant in this research may be addressed to the committee chairperson, Clemson Centre, 391 College Avenue, Suite 406,
Clemson, SC 29631. Phone (864) 656-0636. E-mail: irb@clemson.edu
You can always contact me if you would like to: review, change or delete the data you have supplied us with (to the extent I am not
otherwise permitted or required to keep such data); receive a copy of your data; ask me questions related to the protection of your data;
or lodge a complaint. You may view the data management plan for this survey by following this link. If you have any questions, please
contact: (Name: Jessica Liberman, Email: jliberm@clemson.edu)
${l://OptOutLink?d=This%20is%20the%20final%20message%20regarding%20this%20survey.}
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